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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of 
Appellate procedure, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
In this case Plaintiff had a civil claim for personal injury 
against Salt Lake County. On contacting the County to determine 
which member of its governing body was designated to receive civil 
claims, Plaintiff's attorney was told by the County that it had 
designated Trish McDonald with the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office to receive the claims. He then called Ms. McDonald who 
confirmed that advice and said send the claim to her. He did so. 
He then negotiated settlement of the claim with the County for a 
substantial period of time. After one year had run from the date 
of the accident, and after Plaintiff had filed her civil complaint, 
the County then claimed that the claim had not been properly served 
because it was not addressed to the County per se, but to Trish. 
This gives rise to the following issues: 
As the County was served as it directed, and the County 
had the authority to designate its attorney to receive the claim, 
wasn't the service proper in the first place? 
In addition, should not the County he estopped? 
Finally, the trial court, without hearing, granted the 
-v-
County's motion, without making any findings of facts, nor 
addressing the issues of agency or estoppel. In making such 
summary disposition, Plaintiff claims the court erred. 
Finally, if under the circumstances the Court feels the 
County and/or its attorney were wrong in first directing the claim 
to be addressed in a certain way, and then later taking advantage 
of what they had directed for the purpose of denying Plaintiff her 
day in court, is this conduct such that Plaintiff should be awarded 
fees for the appeal? 
-vi-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff has a claim against Salt Lake County for personal 
injuries sustained in her automobile accident caused by negligent 
driving of a Salt Lake County employee. During negotiations the 
County has previously paid her $680 in settlement of her property 
damage claim for damage to her vehicle. 
Plaintiff seeks to return to the trial court to recover 
appropriate personal injury damages. 
The case is before this court now because the trial court 
dismissed her complaint because she failed as a preliminary matter 
to give proper notice of her claim to the Salt Lake County 
Commission. 
Plaintiff claims the trial court erred in so ruling. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This Appeal is from a Final Judgement granting Defendant's 
Rule 12(b)(i) U.R.C.P. Motion to Dismiss for lack of Jurisdiction, 
the issue being whether Plaintiff properly served notice of a civil 
claim against Salt Lake County. 
February 1, 1993, Plaintiff injured by Salt Lake County vehicle. 
April 22, 1993, Plaintiff serves notice of civil claim on Salt Lake 
County. 
1 
January 28, 1994, Plaintiff files suit against the County and it's 
driver, Heather Merritt. 
February 22, 1994, County Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(3) U.R.C.P. 
March 29, 1994, County Motion granted and case dismissed. 
April 28, 1994, Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal Order. 
June 13, 1994, Motion to Set Aside Denied. 
June 27, 1994, Notice of Appeal Filed. 
2 
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claims against the County. It gave Plaintiff's counsel Trish's 
telephone number. These are very explicit instructions. 
4. April 22, 1993. Plaintiff's counsel called Ms. Trish 
McDonald. She told him the Commission's instruction to him was 
correct, the claim should be sent to her, and gave him her room 
number and address. These are also explicit instructions. He 
then, on the same day, readdressed his letter from the Commission 
to her, sent it to her certified mail, and received back the mail 
receipt signed by her. 
5. In so acting, Plaintiff's counsel accepted the 
Commission's designation of her, as representative of its attorney, 
as its agent to receive the claim, and her confirmation of that 
agency. 
6. April, 1993 - January, 1994. Plaintiff's counsel and the 
County Attorney actively work together on the merits of Plaintiff's 
claim. First Trish acted for the County, then Colleen Cronin, took 
over. In May, 1993, the County issued its check to Plaintiff 
paying her $680 property damage claim for the damage to her 
vehicle. Plaintiff's personal injury claim remained open. 
7. Plaintiff does not contend that mailing to the County 
Attorney is the County's standard practice. In this case though, 
as he made the preliminary inquiry to the Commission, these were 
the directions given him. 
8. As time went on during these negotiations, it became 
apparent that the case could not be readily resolved. 
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C. With this health history, Plaintiff had a very major 
claim for damages against the County, while the County obviously 
had the right to fully offset any pre-existing problems, and stand 
responsible only for what degree of aggravation the accident caused 
that could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. It also 
became obvious that it would take a substantial amount of time for 
Plaintiff to reach a plateau, a permanent condition, as a base from 
which her doctors could assess the degree to which her new 
disability was caused by the accident as opposed to the degree to 
which it was attributable to her pre-existing condition. Plaintiff 
believed she had until July 22, 1994, to file suit under 63-30-15 
U.C.A., which provides a claim not admitted is inferentially denied 
90 days after its filing, and then gives the claimant one year from 
that date in which to file suit. She thought her suit was filed 
not late, but six months early in January, 1994. Plaintiff had not 
taken, and does not take the position that the County admitted 
liability or waived apportionment of negligence, by its earlier 
paying her property damage claim, as such is frequently done by 
defendants in similar cases where the claim of liability is strong, 
as a practical matter and no waiver of defenses is made thereby. 
9. January 28, 1994. Accordingly, as a year from the date 
of Plaintiff's accident approached, and her claim was neither 
admitted nor rejected, Plaintiff's counsel advised the County 
Attorney that, as the full discovery afforded by litigation and 
time, were both needed, that he would file a formal Complaint and 
6 
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the County to send her the claim as she was authorized to receive 
it? As neither fact is denied, both are admitted. (Rule 8, 
U.R.C.P.) 
14. As a matter of fact, if the County itself had chosen to 
file an affidavit in opposition to Plaintiff's counsel's verified 
Answer which stated these facts (Ex. 3), it had full opportunity 
and freedom to do so. Such a response, if he erred, wold be 
expected. The Commission would have done that had it been proper. 
Plaintiff believes the factual reason the Commission did not do so, 
was that Plaintiff's counsel's statement of facts was known by it 
to be entirely correct. 
15. There is a tension between the County and its Attorney. 
There is no word in the record from the County itself denying it 
was served as it directed. 
16. The factual focus should be on what really happened - the 
County Attorney has changed position. 
17. First, the County Attorney says - send us the claim as 
designated, authorized attorney for the County, then it negotiates 
the claim. In all this it properly acts as attorney - agent of the 
County. 
18. Second, as soon as the one year statute of limitations to 
file a claim has run, the County Attorney then says it is not the 
County's agent, so Plaintiff's believing what it and the County 
said is fatal to her claim. 
19. The tension referred to above is clear now - while the 
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On the merits the issue is whether a county may not be served 
with a civil claim in the manner it directs, even though that is a 
slight variation from the manner provided by statute. With that, 
as the County admitted it made such direction, which Plaintiff 
followed, is not the County estopped from denying proper service? 
Also, as the County acknowledges receipt of the claim and its 
processing by the County Attorney staff members assigned to civil 
claims so that there is no prejudice to the County, is not the 
dismissal hypertechnical? 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. 
THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AN APPEAL FROM A RULE 12 
(b)(2), U.R.C.P. DECISION IS TO GIVE NO DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING. 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 
(Utah 1991), holds that because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
ruling is a question of law, the Appellate Court gives the Trial 
Court's ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness 
standard. 
In this case Defendant's motion was under 12(b)(2), lack of 
jurisdiction, but the rationale is the same as for Rule 12(b)(6). 
Defendant proposes in its Motion for Summary Disposition this 
Court should follow Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
accordingly broad discretion should be given the Trial Court in 
deference to its decision. 
10 
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Point 2 
AS PLAINTIFF PROPERLY SERVED HER CIVIL CLAIM NOTICE ON SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING HER SUIT, AND AT 
THE LEAST AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDES ENTRY OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Park rity Assoc v. Board of Education, I'M 4 Utah Adv. Rep, 39 
(July ;>' ", j.994), is the most recent appellate sLaLejueul i | nut. 
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P. 2d 320 (Utah, 1991). Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. 
The rulings of the trial judge, (Ex, 5 & 9) showed no analysis 
of the three dispositive admitted facts: (1) that the County 
designated its attorney, the Salt Lake County Attorney, and 
specifically Trish McDonald to receive the claim, (2) that Salt 
Lake County, through Trish, confirmed that advice, and also 
directed Plaintiff's counsel to mail the claim to Ms, McDonald, and 
(3) the County Attorney then negotiated Plaintiff's claim in the 
interest of the County for nine months. 
In the trial judge failing to deal with these facts, some 
complaint may be made of the briefing submitted to the trial court 
by the County Attorney. In each of its pleadings, (Ex. 2, 4, & 7) 
these read simply as if Plaintiff had sua sponte misaddressed her 
claim from the "governing body" of the County (60-30-13) to its 
attorney. They omit all reference to the facts. They do not deny 
the three above dispositive facts stated by Plaintiff in her 
Answer, and thereby admit them as true. 
Rule 56(c),(e), U.R.C.P., together with Rule 8(d) U.R.C.P.-
("General Rules of Pleadings-effect of failure to deny"), all hold 
that facts properly alleged are deemed admitted if not denied and 
that denials must be made in such form as would be admissible in 
evidence and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify as to the matter stated therein. Facts not denied are 
admitted. Gerard v. Young, 432 P. 2d 343 (Utah 1968). D & L 
Supply v. Saurini, 775 P. 2d 420 (Utah 1989). Treloggan v. 
12 
Treloggan, 669 P. 2d 747 (Utah 1985). 
Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate Mr. Sawaya is 
competent to testify to all acts of the County Commission, so the 
portion of his affidavit (Ex. 7) stating the County did not "waive 
the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act," is 
both incompetent and immaterial. It is incompetent because he is 
not the County and has no known authority to make factual 
statements for it. It is immaterial because it is not in point. 
The point is not whether the County waived the Immunity Act. The 
point is whether the County designated its attorney to receive a 
civil claim, not waiving the act, but simply ensuring its most 
efficient application. Every experienced administrator and 
attorney, whether representing large institutions or dealing with 
them from the outside, has had occasions when important papers have 
had no response because they weren't submitted to the person 
knowledgeable and responsive. 
The County designating Trish to receive the claim was simply 
its effort to have the claim received by such a person. This is no 
waiver of immunity. It is a delegation of authority, the 
designation of an agent to act for the County in receiving and 
processing the claim. 
Rule 5(b) U.R.C.P. Service: How Made. (1) States "whenever 
under these rules service required are permitted to be made upon a 
party represented by an attorney this service shall be made upon 
the attorney." 
13 
Rule 4(e) (11) U.R.C.P. Personal Service. Provides service 
can be made "upon a department or agency of the State of Utah, or 
upon any public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by 
delivering a copy to any member of its governing board, or its 
executive employee or secretary." 
The attorney for a municipal entity does not come exactly 
within any of these designations, but certainly a County Attorney 
is in a real sense an executive employee of the County whom the 
attorney serves. 
Here, the County permitted and directed (Rule 5(b) U.R.C.P.) 
its attorney to receive a legal paper. 
Counties do not exist as corporeal bodies. As a municipality 
can act only through its agents, it may certainly designate the 
appropriate agent, for its own purposes, to act for it, including 
the receipt of papers. 
That is all this case about. The County Attorney has 
submitted no law disputing Plaintiff's basic contention that the 
"governing body" of the County (63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated) had 
such authority. 
In sum, had the County Attorney commenced its 12(b) Motion to 
Dismiss by advising the court forthrightly of the three vital facts 
and of its change of position after the one year claim statute of 
limitations had run, the trial court would undoubtedly have held 
that the County either was properly serve,d being served as it had 
directed, or that it would be estopped from denying the propriety 
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of service, or that, under these circumstances, complaint of such 
service would be a hyper-technicality not serving justice 
Plaintiff is a human, severely injured by the County. More 
should be needed than we have here to deny her a day in Court. (See 
Point 4) 
At any rate, the issue of fact is there and summary 
disposition is not appropriate until it has been disposed of. 
An interesting way of approaching this matter of the County 
Attorney taking a position while ignoring the facts is well set out 
in the June, 1994 edition of Discover Magazine at page 42, in its 
discussion of the analytic concept of "reductionism". 
Discover explains that "reductionism" is expounding on the X 
of an equation while ignoring the Y. 
As an example, one might say he is justified in refusing to 
pay taxes because they cost him money, the X, while ignoring the 
governments need for funding for highways, etc., the Y. 
Discover says: 
"Reductionism is the extrapolation of a sound and worthy 
concept to the degree that it becomes removed from the larger 
reality of life." 
The County Attorney has applied reductionism in this case. It 
implicitly admits the facts Plaintiff asserts, but ignores them. 
In essence it argues X - the claim is addressed to the County 
Attorney contrary to statutory language - and ignores the Y - this 
was done because the County and its attorney so requested. 
15 
Is there not something badly wrong in an attorney-agent, who 
actively acts as agent for a long time, then saying the other party 
was, in essence, a fool for believing the attorney's own words and 
acts, by the attorney then denying it was an agent? This is when, 
as here, the attorney admits all of its work and acts as agent, but 
says these should just be ignored as if they were not facts. This 
is reductionism in an extreme form and not to be accepted from an 
attorney 
Those facts simply cannot be ignored. 
As result, Plaintiff conceives this case to be a single issue, 
which is really a non-issue. Nothing wrong was done. There is no 
conflict between Plaintiff and the County. 
If for any reason that point fails, Plaintiff then addresses 
the secondary issues of estoppel (Argument Point 3) and hyper-
technicality (Argument Point 4). 
With that, if the primary issue is accepted, Plaintiff adds an 
issue asking that she receive her fees and costs for all time 
expended herein since receipt of the County Attorney's motion (not 
asked by her at the trial level), or at least in connection with 
this appeal (Argument Point 5). 
What should happen in this case, is that the Order of 
Dismissal should be reversed and the case should be referred 
immediately back to the Trial Court, because Plaintiff is now in a 
position where her injuries have been adequately defined, she needs 
to get to court promptly and the County Attorney should no longer 
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be allowed to stand in her way. 
Point 3 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, SALT LAKE COUNTY IS ESTOPPED 
FROM DENYING IT WAS PROPERLY SERVED WITH PLAINTIFF1S CLAIM. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
"Estoppel" is a matter of law. As such, where the facts 
justify use of the doctrine, no deference should be accorded the 
Trial Court. Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P. 2d 715, 
718 (Utah 1982). 
It is difficult, but not impossible, to estop a County. 
As a general rule estoppel cannot be asserted against a 
governmental agency, but there is an exception where the interests 
of justice mandate. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 
805 P. 2d 789 (Utah App. 1991) held the exception applied when: 
"... the interests of justice mandate an exception to the 
general rule. In cases where such an issue arises, the 
critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts may be 
found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is 
of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." (At 792). 
Accord, Consolidation Coal v. Utah Division of State Lands, 
253 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1994). 
A case quite close to this on the facts is Eldridae v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd., 795 P. 2d 671 (Utah App. 1990), involving a 
state employee who had five years of service, left the state, then 
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returned and worked twenty more years. When the state announced an 
employee with twenty-five years could retire he asked as to whether 
his five previous years service would count. On a strict 
interpretation of the retirement rules, his service did not count, 
but members of the State Retirement Board misinterpreted their own 
rules, told him it did apply and his five years did 
count, so when his necessary time was completed, including those 
early years, he retired. He was then barred from receiving full 
retirement. 
On appeal it was held the state was estopped from denying him 
full benefits under the circumstances. 
Mr. Eldridge's reliance on advice given him by officials of 
the state, the fact of the advice, and his detriment are very 
similar to Plaintiff's reliance on the County Commission and its 
Attorney. 
Eldridge summarized the exception to the non-estoppel rules 
succinctly, stating: 
"As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of 
estoppel is not assertable against the state and its agencies. 
Utah courts have, however, carved out an exception to this 
general common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is 
plain that the interests of justice so require." In cases 
where such an interest arises, the critical inquiry is whether 
it appears that the facts may be found with such certainty, 
and the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to 
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invoke the exception." 
Accord, Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P. 2d 715, 718 
(Utah 1982). It uses language particularly appropriate here: 
"We have no doubt about the soundness nor the salutary 
purpose of the rule that estoppel generally is not assertable 
against the government or governmental institutions. There 
are good and sufficient reasons for that rule, including the 
safeguarding of the interests of the public, which are often 
somewhat in hazard because of the vagaries of political tides, 
freguent changes of public officials, the possibility of 
collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up by law, then 
suing for the value of goods furnished or services rendered. 
Notwithstanding our approval of that rule, like most general 
rules, there are exceptions when its rigid application would 
defeat, rather than serve, the higher purpose that all rules 
are intended to serve; that of doing justice, (emphasis added) 
The rule is therefore applied when it will serve that purpose. 
But in unusual circumstances, when it is plainly apparent that 
its application would result in injustice, and there would be 
no substantial adverse effect on public policy, the courts 
will honor the higher purpose of doing justice by invoking the 
exception, rather than departing from that desired objective 
in slavish adherence to a general rule." 
The above guote is entirely in harmony with the whole purpose 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as stated at Rule 1(a) that 
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the rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action." 
This Rule is really the guiding light for the conduct of all 
practice. It seems to be so simple and eloquent, and on point, 
that it gets overlooked for more technical basis of guidance. 
Recapitulating the facts for the purpose of this point, the 
Salt Lake County Commission itself does not deny that it had actual 
notice of Plaintiff's claim, nor does it assert that it was 
prejudiced in any way by the claim being addressed to Ms. McDonald. 
It does not deny Ms. McDonald was designated by it to receive the 
claim, it does not deny that the Salt Lake County Attorney was 
authorized by it to process civil claims against it, nor does it 
deny that Plaintiff's counsel reasonably and in good faith acted on 
the basis of the instructions and conduct of the County through its 
Commission and Attorney in acting as he did. 
If the Court reviews Exhibit 1, it is clear that the claim is 
carefully drafted to cover every single requirement of 63-31-11 
(Claim-Contents), Utah Code Annotated, except for it being 
specifically addressed to Trish McDonald, and that address occurred 
because Plaintiff's counsel readdressed his letter from the 
Commission Attorney to the County Commission in compliance with 
them telling him to do so. 
Equitable estoppel covers this matter, even against a County. 
The principle is well stated in FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen 
Dairy, 617 P. 2d 327 (Utah 1980) which held equitable estoppel is 
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intended 
"...to prevent one party from deluding or inducing 
another into a position where he will unduly suffer loss. As 
applicable here, the test is whether there is conduct, by act 
or omission, by which one party, knowingly leads another 
party, reasonably relying thereon, to take some course of 
action, which will result in his detriment if the first party 
is allowed to repudiate or deny his conduct or 
representation." 
FMA is square on point here. The County, or at least the 
County Attorney, seeks to repudiate and deny their previous conduct 
and representations. 
Point 4 
AS SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS PROPERLY SERVED FOR EVERY 
FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE, AND SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE DISMISSING THIS CASE 
ON THE PRESENT BASIS WOULD BE A HYPER-TECHNICALITY, NEEDLESSLY 
HARMFUL TO PLAINTIFF AND, AS SUCH, NOT JUSTIFIED BY LAW. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The standard of review is not precisely 
defined. It would seem appropriate that a reviewing Court has full 
authority to reverse a lower Court without deference to the lower 
Courts conclusions of law, when the facts show the lower Courts 
decision is hypertechnical. 
The court makes no claim it was prejudicial. It admits it 
received the claim in the manner it requested. It admits it was 
fully advised in every way Utah Code Ann. Sections 63-30-11 & 13, 
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provided for it's protection. Still, Defendant says Plaintiff 
shall have no day in court because the first line of her claim says 
"Trish McDonald". 
Rule 61. U.R.C.P. Harmless Error. 
"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in 
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not 
affect the substantial right of the parties. 
See also Wells v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 590 P. 2d 1261 
(Utah 1979) at 1263. Wells not only covers the principle of law 
that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, i.e., 
Salt Lake County is responsible for the authorized acts of its 
Attorney. It also holds, at page 1263: 
"When a motion to dismiss is made, the trial court should 
adhere to a policy of being reluctant to turn a party out 
of court without a trial. A dismissal which does so is 
a severe measure and such a motion should be granted only 
when it clearly appears that the party would not be 
entitled to relief under any stated facts provable in 
support of its claim. In ruling on such a motion, the 
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court should accept as true all material allegations and 
such reasonable inferences as to proof that properly 
could be adduced thereunder." 
There is no word in the record of any prejudice to the County. 
There is none. 
This is the kind of hyper-technicality opposed to the concept 
of Rule 61, supra, and Wells and Utah State University v. Sutro 
supra. Such a concept also flys directly in the face of the most 
important of all of the rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1, with its 
three magnificent adjectives that the Rules "shall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action". 
Point 5 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. An Appellate Court awards fees at its own 
discretion. Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defines a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief or other paper as "one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a 
good faith argument. . ." 
Plaintiff submits that the case is on appeal due to 
unwarranted pleadings filed by Salt Lake County on behalf of the 
Salt Lake County Commission. 
Their omission of the vital facts necessary to fully advise 
the trial court does not meet the requirements of Rule 11, 
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U.R.C.P., as the County and its Attorney had a duty to tell Judge 
Frederick that Plaintiff's claim was addressed to the County 
Attorney, not the Commission, only because both the commission and 
its attorney told him to do so. 
In violation of Rule 11, the County Attorney breached that 
duty. 
There is only one reason it did so. Judge Frederick would 
have denied their Motion out of hand had he been fully advised. 
In this sense, the "Motion" pursuant to Rule 33, U.R.A.P. is 
frivolous as it is not grounded in fact nor warranted by existing 
law. 
Plaintiff has been required to defend an unjustified motion 
and, as such, is entitled to costs and fees. 
Plaintiff did not ask for fees in the trial court. She asks 
now for fees and costs on this appeal for the policy reasons 
comparable to those in Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 
244 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (July 29, 1994). 
Granted her claim is of lesser moment to the public in 
general, the County Attorney's manner of conduct in seeking to keep 
her out of court, was intended to cause her devastating loss. 
Particularly not to be countenanced is that the County Attorney, 
professional lawyers, induced her to file her claim with it 
directly and specifically, induced her to remain in negotiations 
with it to settle her claim until the statute of limitations had 
run on it, and then immediately denied it had any authority to so 
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induce or act. 
This conduct is reprehensible. 
For the County Attorney now to say it had its fingers crossed 
is unacceptable. 
Rule 1, U.R.C.P. states that civil procedure should be handled 
in such a manner as to be just, speedy and inexpensive. 
Through its conduct, the County has violated each of those 
adjectives. 
Plaintiff is a person, a citizen. Already she has suffered a 
full years delay. That is genuine harm. Not justified. 
Fees should be awarded, as above, and in addition, as per 
Stewart, supra, due to the character of this case in which the 
County Attorney simply ignored all of its own conduct and that of 
the Commission is wrong. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff prays Judge Frederick's Order be reversed, the case 
forthwith returned to the trial court, and that she recover her 
fees and costs for this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED February 16, 19 95. 
Samuel King 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to 
Michael E. Postma, Salt Lake County Attorney, 2001 South State 
Street, Rm. S-3400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200, February *k€f 
1995. if 
Samuel King ^ 
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ADDENDUM 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
63-30-13.CLAIM AGAINST POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR ITS EMPLOYEE — 
TIME FOR FILING NOTICE. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of 
his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time 
granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
63-30-14. CLAIM FOR INJURY ~ APPROVAL OR DENIAL BY 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY OR INSURANCE CARRIER WITHIN 
NINETY DAYS. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental 
entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the 
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be 
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period 
the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to 
approve or deny the claim. 
27 
63-30-15. DENIAL OF CLAIM FOR INJURY -- AUTHORITY AND TIME FOR 
FILING ACTION AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an 
action in the district court against the governmental entity or an 
employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after 
denial of the claim or within one year after the denial period 
specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
REPRODUCTION OF OPINIONS, CENTRAL DOCUMENTS 
These are attached as Exhibits 1-9 
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KING & DENT 
Attorneys at Law 
ue! King An Association of Sole Practitioners 
old J. Dent, Jr. 2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301 Telephone (801)486-3751 
c P. Hartmn Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 Fax Ho. (801)486-3753 
A p r i l 2 2 , 1993 
RECEIVED 
Ms. Trish McDonald 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office APR 2 3 f0::3 
201 South State St.—S-3400 
Salt Lake City, DT 84190-1200 COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Re: Caren A. Bichsel-claimant R'SK MANAGEMENT 
Heather J. Merritt—county representative 
Dear Ms. McDonald: 
On February 1, 1993, an accident occurred involving three vehicles. 
Heather J. Merritt was driving a Salt Lake County 1985 blue 
Citation, license number 133 85 EX. Felicia Hill was driving a 
1978 Oldsmobile stationwagon. My client, Caren Bichsel, was 
driving a 1980 Ford Thunderbird. 
The accident occurred at approximately 3:45 P.M. at 3546 South 700 
West. Ms. Bichsel, driving north, was going to turn into the 
Children's Shelter. She saw Heather's vehicle coming out of the 
shelter parking lot onto 7th West. She saw Heather looking at her 
rather than north for oncoming traffic. At the same time, Ms. 
Bichsel saw the vehicle driven by Felicia traveling south on 7th 
West. 
Ms. Bichsel had her turn signal on. It appeared to her there would 
be a collision because Heather was pulling into the street right in 
front of the line being followed by Felicia. Ms. Bichsel applied 
her brakes and stopped south of where she would have made the turn 
into the Shelter parking lot. Heather started to enter 7th West, 
turning south. Ms. Hill swerved left, toward Ms. Bichsel, but 
still hit the rear of Heather's vehicle• The impact flipped 
Felicia's vehicle sideways and it collided head-on with the Bichsel 
vehicle which was then stopped. That is, it hit the front of Ms. 
Bichsel's car with the side of Felicia's. 
Ms. Bichsel's understanding was that Heather was a volunteer 
driving children for the county. She was also told that Heather 
had just completed defensive driving school two days before. 
Photographs of the accident were taken by Tony Montano, a county 
employee. The accident was investigated by Deputy R. E. Rook, Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's office. 
Ms. Trish McDonald 
April 22, 1993 
Page 2 
It would seem the accident was directly caused by the failure to 
keep a proper lookout of Heather. There may be a question of 
contributory negligence on the part of Felicia. That is, should 
she have reacted sooner as Ms. Bichsel did? 
Injury; Before this accident occurred, Ms. Bichsel, who had been 
a long line semi-truck driver, had had three back operations 
resulting from vehicle accidents. Two were performed in Salt Lake 
County by Dr. Robert Home. The last one was performed by Dr. 
Robert Williams, a neurologist in LasVegas. As a result, Ms. 
Bichsel is receiving early total disability benefits from Social 
Security. Her medical bills are met by Medicare and Medicaid. 
Since this accident occurred, Ms. Bichsel, who was ambulatory and 
capable of driving, has had her pre-existing back problems greatly 
worsened together with new problems incident to the collision. She 
had her seat belt fastened when the accident occurred. She has had 
medical expense to date for injuries through her back from neck to 
lumbar area of almost $4,000 to date. 
We are unable to evaluate the degree of her injury at this time 
because of the pre-existing complications. The neck is a new 
problem. Her prior injuries have not involved it. 
Ms. Bichsel is being attended by Wayne Hebertson, neurologist, as 
primary attending physician. She is receiving physical therapy 
from Lance Himelwright at Cottonwood Hospital. To this date, 2 1/2 
months after the accident, she has endured an intense level of pain 
that she wasn't suffering prior to the accident and is disabled to 
a higher degree than she had been before the accident. She can't 
drive. She receives taxi through welfare and Grocery Maid for her 
groceries. 
Damages: I would estimate Ms. Bichsel's damages incident to the 
February 1, 1993, accident at a minimum of $100,000. 
Enclosed is Ms. Bichsel's authorization for me and my associate, 
Harold J. Dent, Jr., to represent Caren in regard to this accident. 
Please contact me concerning this matter. 
Sincerely, 
SAMUEL KING 
SK/has 
cc: Caren Bichsel 
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DAVID-E. YOCOM (#3581") 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (810) 468-3421 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL, 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEATHER J. MERRITT, 
LAKE COUNTY, 
defendants. 
and SALT 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 940900564PI 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant Salt Lake County hereby moves this Court for an 
Order dismissing plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for lack of jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff failed to file a proper Notice of Claim as required by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and is now time barred from 
bringing this action. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1989) . 
DATED this 'Z'Z. day of February, 1994. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
:CHAEL/E. POSTMA 
Jeputy/County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ^-X day of February, 1994, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss 
to the following: 
SAMUEL KING 
HAROLD J. DENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (810) 468-3421 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL, 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEATHER J. MERRITT, 
LAKE COUNTY, 
defendants. 
and SALT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 940900564PI 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Salt Lake County respectfully submits the following 
Memorandum in Support of Salt Lake County's Motion to Dismiss. 
FACTS 
1. On February 1, 1993, plaintiff alleges that she was 
injured in an automobile accident caused by Heather J. Merritt, 
an employee of Salt Lake County. 
2. On April 23, 1993, plaintiff served a Notice of Claim 
upon the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. (See Exhibit 1, 
Notice of Claim). The Notice of Claim was addressed to Ms. Trish 
McDonald, Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. 
This case waj filed on January 28, 1994, 
*±. On Janua;." i ' ««" *1 mir , i '• •»>-;, » , d i upy or the 
summons and complaint: unon Salt: Lake County Commissioner 
3radlsy* and ::: February q ( 1994, p l a i n t i f f s e r v e d a copy af i u^ 
•
 fc.i--ii uui a Ait il.iiei i c r r i t t , 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE A PROPER NOTICE OF CLAIM .*_ 
REQUIRED BY THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND IS 
NOW TIME BARRED FROM. BRINGING THIS ACTION 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act mandates that: a NO'tice of 
Claim be filed with r n ^  'f'Tnvnrn i ng faody *! D f a po1i t ica1 
subdivision before an action may be instituted against the 
governmental entity. Specifically, the Governmental immunity Act 
provi des: 
A claim against a political subdivision, or 
against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority, is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the governing body 
of the political subdivision within one year after the 
claim arises . 
Utah Code Ann, 5 £ * - JO• If n9flq,i i^muhaiii , ni^iM IILU LlLali 
Supreme "Jouri: has ue-.a nnac che statutory riotxce requirement is a 
jurisdictional requirement and a precondition to suit. See 
1
 Salt Lake County notes for the record that service upon 
Commissioner is ineffective as to Salt Lake County. The proper 
process agent for Salt Lake County is the Salt Lake County Clerk. 
See Rule 4 (e) (7) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Lama.': . uLin ai.dLe -est . ct I'ransp ,: 828 P. 2 d 5 3 5 , 54 0 (Utah 
Ct, App. 1992) v que ting Madseri v Bor» 'n lj , '"h? P.2d 245, 250 
(Utah 1988) j. Section 61- " ' "« ]c v*n auie-uu a* , iiimiiiiiLy Act 
is a "companion" statute LJ section 63-30-12 cited by the Court 
in Lamarr. Id. at 542 "Section 61-30-13 is identical 
seet:rn " u "' *x::epi Hhat. • lit' M-iTte, .-ippLles to political 
subdivisions, whereas the latter applies to state agencies " Id. 
Lack of jurisdiction can b^ n u e d ar anw tiinp -y in p party 
cr * . See >^ 5(,,i v aa-t ^aka City ochcel 2ist .
 ; 724 ?, 2d 
960; 964 (Utah 1986' . Rule 12 fh) \2) of the Ut.an Rules cf Civ.l 
Procedure makes dismissal t • ^  int'1' n ' i: isdi j .ucn naudcu. jy. 
r'd-.-.uie 33 give proper notice under section 6"--30-13 is grounds 
for dismissal of the suit, Lamarr v rJtah State Dent __o.f 
Transp lni ^ "-• r^ <i MM n n ,i lii^ 
Moreover, trie Qtan Supreme Tourt has indicated that "actual 
notice cannot cure a fa?.lure fn ccmply with tru-1 nof^'M " r ^ v- sions 
'n Mvei meM J jiiimiiiiLy ^.
 t_d. i Citing Varoz v Sevev, 
50o P.2a 435 (Utah 1973 /. See also Sears v Southworth, 563 
^ 2d 192, 194 'Utah 1377). The Uta1 7 M M M I H ' ',•- !v, 
-lib., M.'-jul-uy ae-i Lhat where a cause Dt action ,.s based upon a 
statute, full compliance with its requirements is a condition 
r^acofipni! in (i i i iiM^ i.i,. i ii Lamarr,, 'i-3 :'. 2 G at 
342. See also Sears v. Southwrt>M 5*3 .?. 2d r*2, 194 (Utah 
3 
1977) ; Scarborough v. Granite School Dist, 5 31 P . 2d 4 8 0 (Utah 
1975) Furthermore, the notice of claim provision " I operates] as 
a one yea r stati ite • :>f I iiiiilat-ii n i i ,i • »>* MJ ;ugiiL aga i i..i i 
governmental entity. "  Warren v. Provo Citzv Corp. , 3 3 8 P. 2d 1125 
(Utah 1992) . A timely notice of claim is required of ail 
pj ainti ffs who woi i ] d i 11^ » J a«jd*.fcib.. a jt: i * i iiiii«nt ,»j. ent ih / , 
Plaintiff's notice of claim was not served upon the 
"governing body" of Sa It Lake County. Rather p] a i rrt: iff ' s n< Dti ce 
o £ c 1 a 11 i i wa s s e i ve d up on t he S a .1 t Lak e Co un t > A11 o rney' s 0 £ £ i c e . 
The county attorney's office is not the "governing body" of Salt 
Lake Count} r. The govern :i ng body of Sa 1 t: I .a k:e Coi ;i riti"]: / ::i s t: he Salt 
Lake County Commission. Plaintiff has failed to file a proper 
notice of claim as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity 
A c t: I" h e r e f o r e p 1 a i n t i f f s c o nip 1 a i n t s h o i i 1 d fa e d i s i n i s s e d. 
Furthermore, plaintiff is now time barred from bringing suit 
against Salt Lake County. Plaintiff's claim arose on February 1, 
1992 Se< :it: :  : i 60 3 0 • 2 3 i)£ the IJta 1 i Code requires that a Notice 
of Claim must be filed "within one year after the claim arises." 
More than one year has passed si nee p] a i nt::i f f s c] a :i m a rose , a n :I 
plaintiff has not properly filed a Notice of Claim with the 
governing body of Salt Lake County. As such, plaintiff's 
c o m D 1 a i n t: s h o u 1 :i b e d i s m i s s e d. 
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DATED this day of Februar-
Salt lake ITcuncy Attorney 
MICHAEL/E. PGSTMA 
iputy/County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby cert if v that on this A>-^ <ic "t" "eDruar1 •><'i d 1. ;:»',' 
mai-.ec a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in 
Support of Salt Lake County's Motion to Dismiss to the following: 
SAMUEL KING 
HAROLD J. DENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
212 0 South 12 0 0' East, No. :Ui 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 6 
YdSffif 
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T.ib.'< 
SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
HAROLD J. DENT, JR., No. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephones < ' 486-3751 
Facsimil ""* "753 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL, ) P L A I N T I F F ' S V E R I F I E D 
) ANSWER TO D E F E N D A N T ' S 
Plaintiff, ) M O T I O N TO DISMISS 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
HEATHER J. JUttut-i. and ) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al. ) Civil No. 940900564 PT 
1 
Defendants. \ mdye .i uernuu i'reaerj.cx 
Did plaintiff properly submit her claim on Salt Lake County? 
The pertinent statute 
•'s « r—_ i-q2._r.ax. _i governmental en*-'.. •-.a--
sairu served upon "The governing body of the political 
subdivisic 
Liu a t'afle, plaintiff made service as requested by 
defendant Salt Lake County. 
fi i,". 11 MI ri i 'ii i I'II'T 
1. The statute does not specify which person within the 
political entity should be served. 
2. Tu m«k.i3 service ** » manner that would best suit Salt 
Lake County _ substantial volume of business, plaintiff's counsel 
Samuel King, before serving the notice of claim, personally 
called the Salt Lake County Commission and asked on whom the 
Commission wanted service to be made of the claim. 
3. Mr. King was advised that the claim should be served 
directly on the Salt Lake County attorney handling these claims. 
He was referred to Trish McDonald, Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney. He then spoke to Trish McDonald on the telephone in 
April, 1993. 
4. Ms. McDonald advised Mr. King that these claims were 
referred to her by the County so that to be sure the proper 
person received the pleadings, they should be mailed directly to 
her as representative of the Salt Lake County Commission. 
5. Accordingly, Mr. King, on April 22, 1993, sent the 
claim to Ms. McDonald. With the notice, he sent a certified mail 
return receipt which was signed in the County Attorney's office 
and returned to him April 23, 1993, by the United States Postal 
Service. 
6. It has been counsel's experience that whenever service 
of a claim on a large entity has to be made, it is important to 
make it to the precise person handling it for the entity, with 
the entity's authority to do so. Otherwise, such claims 
sometimes don't get appropriate attention or are lost in the 
shuffle. 
7. Salt Lake County is clearly aware of that problem. For 
that reason, it set up a procedure that service on the County 
should be made by service of the claim on the county attorney 
2 
actually handling those claims. 
8. Plaintiff's counsel simply followed the procedure that 
Salt Lake County had in force and requested he follow. 
9. After service by mail on Ms, McDonald, Mr, King had 
some conversations with her concerning handling of the claim. It 
appears that plaintiff's back injury is serious. She had a prior 
total disability due to other back injuries, was almost ready to 
go back to work when this accident occurred and this accident 
aggravated her condition to the point where she is again disabled 
and incapable of working. This poses a substantial problem for 
her attending physicians in determining the degree of damage to 
her back attributable to this accident. With that, Mr. King and 
Ms. McDonald agreed that the case would be difficult to settle 
within one year and to expedite it and, to have complete 
discovery, that filing the suit was best. These conversations 
occurred in part with Coleen Cronin, Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney who succeeded Ms. McDonald as handling claims against 
Salt Lake County. 
10. When that agreement was reached, plaintiff's counsel 
then filed suit. 
ARGUMENT 
Any entity receiving a claim has the discretion of 
designating a person to receive that claim. In this case, Salt 
Lake County wanted the claim received by the Deputy County 
Attorney handling those claims. 
Plaintiff simply followed the procedure set up by Salt Lake 
3 
County. 
As such: 
a. Service was properly made. 
b. The county, having designated the manner in which it 
wanted service of the claim made, has hereby waived any complaint 
as to such service. 
DATED March 4, 1994. 
SAMUEL KING>^ 
STATE OF UTAH} 
ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE} 
COMES NOW Samuel King and being first duly sworn deposes and 
says: 1. He is attorney for the plaintiff in the above entitled 
action; 2. He has read the contents of the foregoing Answer and 
they are true. 
SAMUEL KING "^ 
&z 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me March 4/, 1994. 
/ # # S S B HAZEL SYKES Notar^ubllcX 
i U!< mam r \ P 7 Eas'0akv,e* »""• j ^ / 
I \>jSlkHK J$! .. Sa» Lake City \i\wMVi • 
I <:'--<25'y «Y Commission Expires'-MAILING CERTIFICATE 
J %%£"• • *S 
STATE OF UTAH 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Michael E. 
Postma, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 South State St., #S340Q, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84190-1200, U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, 
March 4, 1994. 
Bischel.Answer 
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Tab 4 
DAVID E. YOCOM (#3581) 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (810) 468-3421 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL, 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEATHER J. MERRITT, 
LAKE COUNTY, 
defendants. 
and SALT 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Civil No. 940900564PI 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants hereby submit the following Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants7 Motion to Dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff argues that service of her Notice of Claim was 
proper because Salt Lake County designated the manner in which it 
wanted service of the claim made, and Salt Lake County waived any 
complaint as to such service. However, Salt Lake County did not 
waive the requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and 
plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of that Act. 
Plaintiff argues that the Governmental Immunity Act "does 
not specify which person within the political entity should be 
served [with the notice of claim]. " See Plaintiff's Verified 
Answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at Hi. However, the 
statute is clear on this point. The statute states that 
plaintiff's Notice of Claim must be served upon the "governing 
body of the political subdivision," Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. 
The Salt Lake County Commission is the "governing body" of Salt 
Lake County. Ms. Trish McDonald, a claims adjustor in the county 
attorney's office, is not the governing body of Salt Lake County. 
Plaintiff's attorney is only required to follow the statutory 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, not the advice of 
a county employee in the commission office. The statute is clear 
and unambiguous. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held 
that where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full 
compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the 
right to maintain suit. See Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of 
Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Plaintiff has failed 
to comply with the statutory requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. As such, plaintiff's complaint should be 
dismissed. 
Plaintiff further argues that it has been "[plaintiff's] 
counsel's experience that whenever service of a claim on a large 
entity has to be made, it is important to make it to the precise 
2 
person handling it for the entity, with the entity's authority to 
do so. Otherwise, such claims sometimes don't get appropriate 
attention or are lost in the shuffle." See Plaintiff's Verified 
Answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at %6. It is 
disingenuous of plaintiff to argue that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act should be ignored because Salt Lake County is a 
large entity, and a Notice of Claim may get "lost in the 
shuffle." By this argument plaintiff tries to excuse her own 
neglect with the rumored neglect of "large entities." This 
argument should not be allowed to succeed. The procedure that 
Salt Lake County follows is that procedure set out in the 
Governmental Immunity Act, and "strict compliance" is required. 
If proper service of plaintiff's Notice of Claim was made, and 
plaintiff's complaint was "lost in the shuffle," then plaintiff's 
complaint would have been deemed denied after ninety days and 
plaintiff would be entitled to file suit. However, plaintiff did 
not file her claim as required. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's attorney was aware of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act and the necessity to file suit within 
one year, yet he ignored the Act's Notice of Claim requirements. 
See Plaintiff's Verified Answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
3 
at f9.* Salt Lake County has done nothing to waive its right to 
strict compliance with the notice requirement of section 63-3 0-
13. Therefore, plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed. 
DATED this If day of February, 1994. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
MLCHAEL^E. POSTMA 
Deputy ^ county Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this / / day of March, 1994, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Defendants7 Motion to Dismiss to the following: 
SAMUEL KING 
HAROLD J. DENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
1
 Plaintiff's attorney is under the incorrect assumption that 
Ms. Trish McDonald and Ms. Coleen Cronin are Deputy Salt Lake 
County Attorney's. Ms. McDonald was a claims adjustor in the 
county attorney's office, and Ms. Cronin is the Salt Lake County 
Risk Manager. 
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Tab 5 
M;,,I 2 3 iss^ 
DAVID E. YOCOM (#3581) 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (810) 468-3421 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL, 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEATHER J. MERRITT, 
LAKE COUNTY, 
defendants. 
and SALT 
ORDER 
Civil 
Judge 
OF DISMISSAL 
No. 9409005S4PI 
J. Dennis Frederick 
The Court having reviewed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, 
Plaintiff's Verified Answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, and for good cause shown; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT plaintiff's complaint is 
dismissed. Plaintiff failed to file a proper Notice of Claim as 
required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and is now time-
barred from bringing this action. 
:.jzJ:m 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this •Ofl 
# day of 
4> 
., 199-3< 
BY THE COURT 
Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this &S2. day of March, 1994, 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL to the following: 
SAMUEL KING 
HAROLD J. DENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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Tab 6 
SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
HAROLD J. DENT, JR., No. 0871 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-3751 
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL, 
P l a i n t i f f , ; 
v s . 
HEATHER J . MERRITT, and 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, e t a l . 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
) P L A I N T I F F ' S MOTION TO 
) SET ASIDE ORDER OF 
l DISMISSAL 
C i v i l No. 940900564 PI 
Judge J . Dennis F r e d e r i c k 
Plaintiff moves the court rescind its order dismissing 
plaintiff's complaint for the reasons set forth in the annexed 
memorandum. 
DATED April 28, 1994. 
SAMUEL KING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Michael E. 
Postma, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 So. State St., #S3400, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84190-1200, U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, April 28, 
1994. 
Bischel.Motion 
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SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
HAROLD J. DENT, JR., No. 0871 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-3751 
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL, 
P l a i n t i f f , ; 
v s . 
HEATHER J . MERRITT, and 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a t a l . ] 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
) P L A I N T I F F ' S MEMORANDUM 
) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
) TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF 
| DISMISSAL 
) C i v i l No. 940900564 PI 
i Judge J . Dennis F r e d e r i c k 
BASIS FOR MOTION 
This motion is made pursuant to Rules 4(e)(11); 6(b); 59(b), 
(e); 60(b)(7), and 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
TIMELINESS 
The court's Order of Dismissal of plaintiff's complaint 
based on plaintiff's alleged failure to properly serve the Salt 
Lake County Board of Commissioners was signed and entered March 
29, 1994. 
This motion is filed more than ten days later due to the the 
Salt Lake County attorney's failure to comply with Rule 4-504(4), 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which puts the duty on a 
party obtaining an order to give notice to the opposing party of 
its date of entry. The County Attorney did not do so. 
1 
This situation was expressly addressed in Workman v. Nacle 
Const.Inc., 802 P2d 749 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Workman, in a virtually identical situation where the ten 
day time limit to file a motion to set aside an order prescribed 
by Rule 59(e) U.R.C.P., was not followed because prevailing 
counsel violated Rule 4-504(4) by not mailing notice of the entry 
of the judgment to the opposing party, the court held the 
judgment was effective as of its date, but that the failure of 
prevailing party to honor the rule requiring timely notice to the 
losing party brought the case squarely within the provisions of 
Rule 60(b)(7), "Any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment ... ." 
Workman held that a prevailing party's breach of their duty 
to give timely notice to the other party is a "weighty factor" to 
be considered in determining whether a late motion seeking relief 
from an order should be considered on the merits. 
That is, the opposing motion is not late if the party with 
the duty to give notice of date of entry breaches that duty. 
The breaching party also has no standing to argue timeliness 
of the other, the breacher not being able to cause delay and then 
complain of it. 
This is consistent with the concept of justice and fairness 
8tated in Rule 6, "Time," (b) "Enlargement," U.R.C.P., that time 
may be enlarged to allow for "excusable neglect." 
Similarly, under Rule 61, U.R.C.P., "Harmless Error," 
2 
". . . no error or defect ... in anything done 
by the court or any of the parties, is ground 
for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order unless such 
refusal to take such action appears to the 
court Inconsistent with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the proceeding 
must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not effect the 
substantial right of the parties.M [Emphasis 
added.] 
In this case, the argument is particularly important, as a 
matter of balance, because the attack on notice of claim by the 
Salt Lake County attorney is so entirely technical (as will be 
discussed infra) that the Workman rationale is persuasive in the 
case at bar. That is, plaintiff's counsel expected defense 
counsel, being so technically demanding of plaintiff, to observe 
the technicalities itself, and to give notice of the actual date 
of entry of the judgment. Instead, the county attorney gave only 
notice of the proposed judgment, not notice of the date of entry 
nor of the final form of the judgment as approved or modified by 
the court, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MEHITS 
THE COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS 
BASED ON A MISTAKEN- ASSUMPTION OF FACT 
The County Commission has not denied that it itself was 
properly served with plaintiff's claim. 
The only facts in the record relative to the propriety of 
plaintiff's service of Notice of Claim on the Salt Lake County 
Commission are those submitted by plaintiff's counsel in his 
verified answer in opposition to the motion of the Salt Lake 
3 
County Attorney to dismiss. 
Plaintiff did in fact serve the Salt Lake County Commission 
in the manner requested by that commission itself and as further 
directed by a deputy county attorney, Trish McDonald, It was 
only after receiving those instructions that plaintiff's claim 
was served by mail addressed to Trish McDonald. 
Plaintiff's affidavit so states. Defense has filed no 
rebuttal affidavit by the Salt Lake County Commission nor any 
member thereof. 
The court's erroneous assumption of fact was that accepting 
as true a simple allegation without factual support filed by the 
Salt Lake County Attorney denying service was properly made upon 
the Salt Lake County Commission. This is not a verified 
statement by the Salt Lake County Commission itself that it was 
not served. It itself has made no such allegation. 
To the contrary, the Salt Lake County Commission indicated 
to plaintiff's counsel, when he called and asked upon whom the 
Commission wanted service on it made, which could be "... its 
governing board, or to its executive employee or secretary," he 
(Rule 4(e)(11) U. R. C. P.)/ he was advised by the commission to 
have the papers submitted directly to the Salt Lake County 
attorney. There is no denial by the Commission itself that such 
attorney serves as a designated agent of its governing board as 
one of its executive employees, nor that its secretary, who 
answered the phone, could not designate the county attorney. The 
statute says service should be made upon "the governing body." 
4 
Neither the statute, nor the governing body, say the county unit 
can't designate an executive, secretary or some other agent, such 
as its attorney, to receive the service. Accordingly, in this 
case, based on the facts now in the record, service was in fact 
made on the Salt Lake County Commission in the manner it chose. 
This complies with service on a county as per Rule 4(e) (11), 
U.R.C.P. 
POINT II. 
HYPERTECHNICALITY 
The Motion to Dismiss made by the Salt Lake County Attorney 
does not even show that it is approved by the Salt Lake County 
Commission itself. 
The Salt Lake County Commission may well in fact take the 
approach that it will deal fairly, rather than hypertechnically, 
with legitimate claims presented to it by citizens injured by 
misconduct of the county's employees. 
Such an approach would be good politics as well as a fair 
handling of the relationship between the citizen and her 
government. 
Lacking any affirmative factual denial by the Commission, or 
its knowledge or approval of the County Attorney's motion to 
dismiss, we have no basis to believe the County itself has any 
objection. 
The only reason that the motion to dismiss was filed was a 
change in deputy county attorneys. 
5 
When the notice of claim was first served on Trish McDonald, 
as shown in plaintiff's counsel's verified answer to the motion 
to dismiss, discussions were had between her and plaintiff's 
counsel in which the merits of plaintiff's claim was discussed, 
both as to the facts of the accident and as to plaintiff's 
injuries. Ultimately, those injuries being difficult to 
evalutate and get a clear prognoisis, the decision was made to 
file suit. That was done near the end of the statutory period 
but was done timely, which is all the law requires. 
It was only through change of the deputy county attorneys 
that the technicality was raised. Had Ms. McDonald advised 
plaintiff that she was not authorized by the County Commission to 
act for it in receiving notice of a claim, the notice would have 
been resubmitted. 
Rules 6 and 61 U.R.C.P have been cited in the previous 
section as dealing with the urge of the courts to do justice in 
the cases before them. Similarly, Rule 1, U.R.C.P., should be 
considered, with its three magnificent adjectives — civil 
procedure, to be handled in such manner as to be "just, speedy 
and inexpensive." 
The Salt Lake County Attorney claims no prejudice of any 
kind. It relies as its primary case in support of its position 
on LaMarr v. State Dept. of Transp., 828 P2d 535 (Utah App. 
1992). 
LaMarr is not dispositive. In LaMarr, the plaintiff was 
required to make dual service on both the Department of 
6 
Transportation and the attorney general. Service was made only 
on one of those entities. No service was made on the other. 
This was held to be fatally defective when the time for filing 
claims had run. 
This case concerns the manner of making service. LaMarr 
dealt only with no service at all. 
PQ1NT 111. 
ESTOPPEL 
Plaintiff concedes it is difficult to estop a governmental 
entity based on conduct of its agents or employees. However, 
that doctrine does have limitations. 
The only issue here is a simple one. The Salt Lake County 
Commission itself established a procedure for receiving service 
of a claim. That was to serve it directly upon its legal 
department. Those facts are stated by plaintiff and not rebutted 
to any degree by the county. Is the county now in a position 
where it can say, having told a plaintiff that it itself could be 
served by serving its executive and agent, the county attorney, 
from saying that plaintiff was a fool for believing the County 
Commission? 
Utah's closest case and most recent in point isn't in point 
on the facts as it deals with the developer relying on acts of a 
county commission, but the identifying concept is clear. Stucker 
v. Summit County, (233 Utah Adv. Rep. 11; 1993) holding in that 
case: 
7 
"The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
equitable estoppel applies only when 'the 
county has committed an act or omission upon 
which the developer could rely in good faith 
in making substantial changes in position or 
incurring extensive expenses,'" (Citations 
omitted.) 
That holding, applies specifically here, i.e., the county 
committed an act upon which a claimant reasonably relied in good 
faith, and her filing her claim as designated by the county was 
the equivalent of the "substantial changes of position" and "good 
faith" referred to in Stucker. 
The county is estopped, has no standing, to say a party 
serving a claim may not follow the procedure the county directs. 
SUMMARY 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff moves the court vacate 
its order dismissing the complaint. 
DATED April 28, 1994. 
SAMUEL KING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Michael E. 
Postma, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 So. State St., #S3400, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84190-1200, U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, April 28 
1994. 
Bischel.memo 
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Tab 7 
DAVID E.YOCOM (#3581) 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (810) 468-3421 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL, 
plaintiff. 
vs. 
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, 
defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 940900564PI 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants hereby submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal 
ARGUMENT 
I PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT SHOULD 
NOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ARTICULATED 
SUFFICIENT REASONS JUSTIFYING RELIEF 
Plaintiffs motion for relief from judgment should not be granted because plaintiff has not 
aniculated sufficient reasons justifying relief. Rule 60(b)(7) allows for relief from judgment for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." "Relief under this 
subsection embodies three requirement: 'First that the reason be one other than those listed in 
subdivisions (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion be 
made within a reasonable time.'" Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382, 387 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304. 1306-07 
(Utah 1982). Also, subsection (7) "should be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by the Court 
only in unusual and exceptional instances." Id. (quoting Hughes v. Sanders. 287 F.Supp. 332, 
334 (E.D.Okla. 1968)). 
Plaintiff has failed to meet the second requirement of this rule, that the reason justify 
relief. Plaintiff has merely reargued and recharacterized the same arguments plaintiff made in 
opposition to defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Merely recharacterizing losing arguments should 
not be an adequate reason to provide plaintiff relief from judgment. Such arguments fail to 
satisfy the court's rigorous demands that subsection (7) be "very cautiously and sparingly 
invoked," and only in "unusual and exceptional instances." 
A, THE COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS NOT BASED UPON 
A MISTAKEN ASSUMPTION OF FACT 
Plaintiff argues that the only facts in the record relative to the propriety of plaintiff s 
service of Notice of Claim on the Salt Lake County Commission are those submitted by 
plaintiffs counsel in his verified answer. Plaintiff further argues that the Salt Lake County 
2 
Commission was required to file an affidavit in rebuttal to plaintiffs counsel's verified answer. 
However, plaintiffs arguments must fail. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss indicates that "[o]n April 23, 1993, plaintiff served a 
Notice of Claim upon the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office." Defendants motion then 
indicates that the Notice of claim is attached as Exhibit 1. The only error in defendants Motion 
to Dismiss is that defendants inadvertently failed to attach the Notice of Claim as Exhibit 1. 
Although the Notice of Claim was referenced, it was inadvertently not included with the motion. 
To remedy this oversight plaintiffs Notice of Claim is attached to this Memorandum in 
Opposition as Exhibit 1. This exhibit, which clearly shows that the Notice of Claim was served 
upon Trish McDonald of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, accompanied with the notice 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act are all the "facts" necessary for defendants 
to succeed on their motion. Defendants are not required to obtain a rebuttal affidavit from the 
Salt Lake County Commission. Plaintiff failed to rebut the facts and law argued by defendants in 
their motion to dismiss. As such, a counter affidavit is not required. Plaintiffs affidavit simply 
does not address the relevant issue of service of plaintiff s notice of claim upon the "governing 
body" of Salt Lake County. Furthermore, plaintiffs argument fails to adequately deal with the 
statutory provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Plaintiff further argues that she did in fact serve the Salt Lake County Commission in the 
manner requested by the commission itself and as further directed by a deputy county attorney, 
3 
Trish McDonald. As a point of clarification, Ms. Trish McDonald is not an attorney and was at 
no time employed as a deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. Ms. McDonald was a claims adjuster 
in the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. See Exhibit 2, Sawaya affidavit. This fact was 
pointed out several times in defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss. However, plaintiffs counsel seems to have ignored this point. Nonetheless, the 
substance of plaintiff s argument was raised by plaintiff in Plaintiffs Verified Answer to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and countered by defendants in their Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act is clear and 
unambiguous. Plaintiff is required to file her notice of claim upon the "governing body" of Salt 
Lake County. Any legal advice that plaintiffs attorney desired should have come from the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act itself and not from a secretary employed by the Salt Lake County 
Commission. A claims adjuster in the county attorney's office is simply not the governing body 
of Salt Lake County. All doubts about who plaintiff should have served her notice of claim upon 
should have been resolved by the statutory source that created the notice of claim requirement. 
Plaintiff further argues that service of her notice of claim was made on the Salt Lake 
County Commission in the manner it chose. However, plaintiff is incorrect in this assumption. 
Salt Lake County has at no time waived the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. Salt Lake County requires strict compliance with the terms of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. Sse Exhibit 2, Sawaya affidavit. There is simply no support for plaintiffs argument that the 
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Salt Lake County Commission has chosen to disregard the immunity act and allow service of 
notice by alternative means. 
Finally, plaintiff argues that service upon the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
"complies with service on a county as per Rule 4(e)(l 1), U.R.C.P." Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment at 5. This assertion by plaintiff is incorrect in several 
respects. First, service of a notice of claim is not governed by Rule 4(e)(l 1), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Service of a notice of claim is governed by Utah Code Ann § 63-30-13. Second, 
Rule 4 deals with service of process, not service of a notice of claim. Finally, even if Rule 4 
were to apply to the facts of the present case, subsection 11 is not the correct subsection. 
Subsection 11 provides for service upon a department or agency of the state of Utah. Salt Lake 
County is not a department or agency of the state of Utah. The correct subsection, if Rule 4 were 
to apply, is subsection 7. Subsection 7 indicates that proper service upon a county is 
accomplished by serving the "county clerk of such county." A claims adjuster in the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office is not the County Clerk of Salt Lake County. Therefore, even if Rule 4 
were applicable, which it clearly is not, plaintiff has still failed to comply with its provisions. 
B. STRICT COMPLIANCE IS REQUIRED BY THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT, NOT "HYPERTECHNICALITY" 
Plaintiff argues that "[t]he Motion to Dismiss made by the Salt Lake County Attorney 
does not even show that it is approved by the Salt Lake County Commission itself." "The Salt 
Lake County Commission may well in fact take the approach that it will deal fairly, rather than 
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hypertechnically, with legitimate claims presented to it by citizens injured by the misconduct of 
the county's employees." Plaintiffs argument, however, borders on the absurd. An argument 
analogous to plaintiffs argument would be that "defendants have no way of knowing whether 
plaintiff in fact desires to sue Salt Lake County." "Plaintiff may well take the position that she 
does not want to sue Salt Lake County." 
The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office is the legal representative of Salt Lake County. 
Since the Salt Lake County Commission is non sui juris, the only way to challenge the actions of 
the commission is to sue the county. The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office moved to dismiss 
plaintiffs lawsuit on behalf of defendants Salt Lake County and Heather J. Merritt. Salt Lake 
County is the county attorney's client. The county attorney's office acts for and on behalf of its 
client, just as plaintiffs counsel acts for and on behalf of plaintiff. To argue that the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office does not represent the views of its client completely ignores the 
realities of county government and the nature of the layer/client relationship. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs "hypertechnicality" argument is completely without merit. As 
was discussed in defendants Motion and Reply, "actual notice cannot cure a failure to comply 
with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of 
Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Varoz v. Sevev. 506 P.2d 435 (Utah 
1973)). See also Sears v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1977). The Utah Supreme Court 
has consistently held that where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance with its 
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requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit. Lamarr. 828 P.2d at 542. 
See 3lso Se^rs v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1977); Scarborough v. Granite School 
Dist. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). Full compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act requires 
service of plaintiffs notice of claim upon the governing body of Salt Lake County. Plaintiff has 
not fully complied with statute. Lamarr is absolutely on point in this regard. What was fatally 
defective in Lamarr was plaintiffs failure to fully comply with the notice requirements of the 
immunity act. Similarly, plaintiffs action is fatally defective because she failed to fully comply 
with the notice provision of the immunity act. Plaintiffs counsel was sufficiently familiar with 
the Governmental Immunity Act to realize that suit must be filed prior to the running of the 
statute of limitations, yet plaintiffs counsel urges a more liberal reading of the notice 
requirement. Plaintiff simply cannot have it both ways. 
Finally, plaintiff argues that M[t]he only reason that the motion to dismiss was filed was a 
change in deputy county attorneys." Plaintiffs argument is simply wrong. As was discussed 
earlier, Ms. Trish McDonald was at no time employed as a deputy county attorney. There was 
no change in deputy county attorneys. Plaintiffs case was assigned to a deputy county attorney 
as soon as plaintiffs complaint was filed. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed because the 
issue was ripe. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed because plaintiff failed to comply with 
the notice provisions of the immunity act. To argue that a motion to dismiss was filed for any 
other reason is simply to argue facts that do not exist. 
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II. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE INVOKED AGAINST SALT 
LAKE COUNTY AND THE SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION 
Plaintiff argues that defendants are estopped from asserting that plaintiff incorrectly filed 
her notice of claim because a secretary in the Salt Lake County Commission's office gave 
plaintiff poor legal advice. However, as conceded by plaintiff, it is difficult to estop a 
governmental entity based on conduct of its agents or employees. 
The controlling case in this area is Utah State Univ. v, Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 
1982). In Sutro the Utah Supreme Court held: "We have no doubt about the soundness nor the 
salutary purpose of the rule that estoppel generally is not assertable against the government or 
governmental institutions." Id. at 718. There is a limited exception to this general principle for 
unusual circumstances "where it is plain that the interests of justice so require." Id. at 720. This 
exception applies only if "the facts may be found with such certainty, and the unjustice suffered 
is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Id-
"The few cases in which Utah courts have permitted estoppel against the government 
have involved very specific written representations by authorized government entities." 
Anderson v. Public Service Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822,827 (Utah 1992). See Celebrity 
Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm.. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) (relying on written 
representations by the Liquor Control Commission that the location of a proposed liquor store in 
a proposed private club facility satisfied the 600 foot zoning requirement); Eldredge v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd.. 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (representatives of the retirement office 
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made oral and written statements assuring plaintiff that he would be credited with the years of 
employment in question). In Anderson the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that only 'Veil-
substantiated representations by government entities" would be sufficient to estop a 
governmental entity. Anderson. 839 P.2d at 828. 
In the present case plaintiff has failed to sufficiently substantiate her allegation that a 
secretary in the Salt Lake County Commission's office instructed plaintiffs counsel to file her 
notice of claim with a claims adjuster employed in the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. 
There are no written statements or representations memorializing this conversation. Without 
such evidence, plaintiffs bare allegations fall far short of the required "well-substantiated 
representations" required by Utah Courts. This is the very reason why Utah courts consistently 
hold that estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity. 
The only case plaintiff cites in support of her estoppel argument is Stucker v. Summit 
County. 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1994). In Stucker the court of appeals 
found that, "equitable estoppel applies only when 'the county [has] committed an act or omission 
upon which the developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in position or 
incurring extensive expenses.'" Li. at 15. Plaintiff argues that "the county committed an act 
upon which [plaintiff] reasonably relied in good faith, and her [sic] filing her claim as designated 
by the county was the equivalent of the 'substantial changes of position' and 'good faith' referred 
to in Stucker." Plaintiffs Memorandum at 8. 
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However, the county did not commit an act upon which plaintiff could rely in good faith. 
The act that plaintiff relied upon was a telephone call by her attorney to a secretary in the Salt 
Lake County Commission's office. Plaintiff does not allege that a County Commissioner waived 
the requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Furthermore, plaintiff does not allege 
that a written waiver was obtained by plaintiff. Plaintiff relied upon an oral representation by an 
unnamed and unaccountable employee of the commission's office staff in determining where to 
file her notice of claim. This is not the type of act which plaintiff should rely upon in good faith, 
particularly in light of the fact that the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
are clear and unambiguous, and contrary to the advice plaintiff was given. As such. Salt Lake 
County should not be estopped to assert plaintiffs failure to comply with the notice provisions of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
III. SANCTIONS 
This court should sanction plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel under Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, for requiring defendants to reply to plaintiffs frivolous Motion to Set Aside 
Order of Dismissal. Plaintiffs motion is not well grounded in existing fact or law. The issues 
were clearly and fully argued prior to this Court's entry of judgment in favor of defendants. 
Therefore, plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel should be required to pay the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set 
Aside Order of Dismissal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside 
Order of Dismissal. 
DATED this 9^~ day of May, 1994. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake Countv Attomev 
MICHAEL E. POSTMA 
Deputy County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this j * * ^ day of May, 1994.1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of 
Dismissal to the following: 
SAMUEL KING 
HAROLD J. DENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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EXHIBIT 1 
KING & DENT 
Attorneys at Law 
amtel King An Association of Sole Practitioners 
arold J. Dent, Jr. 2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301 Telephone (801)486-3751 
r1c P. Hartman Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 Fax Ho. (801)486-3753 
A p r i l 22 , 1993 
RECEIVED 
Ms. Trish McDonald 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office APR 2 3 f0Q3 
201 South State St-— S-3400 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84190-1200 COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Re: Caren A. Bichsel—claimant 
Heather J- Merritt—county representative 
Dear Ms. McDonald: 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
On February 1, 1993, an accident occurred involving three vehicles. 
Heather J. Merritt was driving a Salt Lake County 19 85 blue 
Citation, license number 133 85 EX. Felicia Hill was driving a 
1978 Oldsmobile stationwagon. My client, Caren Bichsel, was 
driving a 1980 Ford Thunderbird. 
The accident occurred at approximately 3:45 P.M. at 3546 South 700 
West. Ms. Bichsel, driving north, was going to turn into the 
Children's Shelter. She saw Heather's vehicle coming out of the 
shelter parking lot onto 7th West. She saw Heather looking at her 
rather than north for oncoming traffic. At the same time, Ms. 
Bichsel saw the vehicle driven by Felicia traveling south on 7th 
West. 
Ms. Bichsel had her turn signal on. It appeared to her there would 
be a collision because Heather was pulling into the street right in 
front of the line being followed by Felicia. Ms. Bichsel applied 
her brakes and sropped south of where she would have made the turn 
into the Shelter parking lot. Heather started to enter 7th West, 
turning south. Ms. Hill swerved left, toward Ms. Bichsel, but 
still hit the rear of Heather's vehicle. The impact flipped 
Felicia's vehicle sideways and it collided head-on with the Bichsel 
vehicle which was then stopped. That is, it hit the front of Ms. 
Bichsel's car with the side of Felicia's. 
Ms. Bichsel's understanding was that Heather was a volunteer 
driving children for the county. She was also told that Heather 
had just completed defensive driving school two days before. 
Photographs of the accident were taken by Tony Montano, a county 
employee. The accident was investigated by Deputy R. E. Rook, Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's office. 
Ms. Trish McDonald 
April 22, 1993 
Page 2 
It would seem the accident was directly caused by the failure to 
keep a proper lookout of Heather. There may be a question of 
contributory negligence on the part of Felicia. That is, should 
she have reacted sooner as Ms. Bichsel did? 
Injury: Before this accident occurred, Ms. Bichsel, who had been 
a long line semi-truck driver, had had three back operations 
resulting from vehicle accidents. Two were performed in Salt Lake 
County by Dr. Robert Home. The last one was performed by Dr. 
Robert Williams, a neurologist in LasVegas. As a result, Ms. 
Bichsel is receiving early total disability benefits from Social 
Security. Her medical bills are met by Medicare and Medicaid. 
Since this accident occurred, Ms. Bichsel, who was ambulatory and 
capable of driving, has had her pre-existing back problems greatly 
worsened together with new problems incident to the collision. She 
had her seat belt fastened when the accident occurred. She has had 
medical expense to date for injuries through her back from neck to 
lumbar area of almost $4,000 to date. 
We are unable to evaluate the degree of her injury at this time 
because of the pre-existing complications. The neck is a new 
problem. Her prior injuries have not involved it. 
Ms. Bichsel is being attended by Wayne Hebertson, neurologist, as 
primary attending physician. She is receiving physical therapy 
from Lance Himelwright at Cottonwood Hospital. To this date, 2 1/2 
months after the accident, she has endured an intense level of pain 
that she wasn't suffering prior to the accident and is disabled to 
a higher degree than she had been before the accident. She can't 
drive. She receives taxi through welfare and Grocery Maid for her 
groceries. 
Damages: I would estimate Ms. Bichsel ''s damages incident to the 
February 1, 1993, accident at a minimum of $100,000. 
Enclosed is Ms. Bichsel's authorization for me and my associate, 
Harold J. Dent, Jr., to represent Caren in regard to this accident. 
Please contact me concerning this matter. 
Sincerely, 
SAMUEL KING 
SK/has 
cc: Caren Bichsel 
EXHIBIT 2 
DAVID E.YOCOM (#3581) 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (810) 468-3421 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL. 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, 
defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD SAWAYA 
Civil No. 940900564PI 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH } 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
I, DONALD SAWAYA, having been duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and state as 
follows: 
1. I am over the age of 21 years and have personal knowledge of the facts set forth 
herein. 
2. I am the Chief Deputy of the Governmental Services Division, of the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office. 
3. During April, 1993, Ms. Irish McDonald was employed by the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office as a claims adjuster. Ms. McDonald is not an attorney and was at no time 
employed as a deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. 
4. Ms. McDonald is not the "governing body" of Salt Lake County, nor has she been 
authorized to accept notices of claim on behalf of the governing body of Salt Lake County. 
5. On April 23, 1994, a Notice of Claim was mailed to Ms. Trish McDonald of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office. No other notice of claim has been received by Salt Lake County 
on behalf of plaintiff Caren A Bischel. 
6. Salt Lake County has at no time waived the notice provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Salt Lake County requires strict compliance with all terms of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Dated this 7«^ day of May, 1994. 
DONALD SAWAYA C / 
Chief Deputy, Governmental 
Services Division 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this Q& 'day of May, 1994. 
NOTAKY Ft.*L,L*C 
C!r.^; Lynn v;;:Ksn3s 
r-*: couth 1100 w»st 
Sslt Lake City, Utsh 84123 
My Commission Expires 
F«oruary 18. 1997 
8TATE OF UTAH 
Notary Publjic
 0 
mmo> 
My commission expires: 
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Tab 8 
SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-3751 
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and ] 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, at al. ] 
Defendants. 
| PLAINTIFF'S REPLY 
| Civil No. 940900564 PI 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
ISSUE 
The issue is one of fact, not of law. 
ARGUMENT 
The fact, as supported by Plaintiffs verified pleading, is 
that Plaintiff did properly serve the Salt Lake County Commission 
in the manner designated by the Commission. 
To rebut that fact an affidavit by the Commission would be 
required, that it did not so authorize. 
That affidavit would have to be factual. It would have to 
state that the Salt Lake County Commission had not designated the 
County Attorney to receive Plaintiff's claim. 
Lacking such an affidavit, and it is lacking, Salt Lake 
County having been served in the manner that it chose may not 
complain thereof. 
1 
What is key here is that the County itself has voiced no 
objection• 
Commissioner Horiuchi, for example, might well be 
embarrassed by the Motion to Dismiss of its agent, and say "But 
of course we'll accept service. Plaintiff only did what we 
asked." 
We lack the County's level. We have only its' attorney'& 
level. 
It does not lie with the County Attorney to reverse 
positions and say Plaintiff was a fool for believing in what it 
first Baid. That would lie with the County and the County ha£ 
not so stated. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's complaint should be reinstated. 
DATED this Z/' day of y ^ ^ t 1994 
-Sa&iue 1 King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Michael 
E. Poatma, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, 
2 
#S3400, Salt lake City, Utah 84190-1200, U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, May 18, 1994. 
this /fl day of ~77?jA? 1994. DATED 
carenbi.pla 
Samuel King ~7/? 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Tab 9 
DAVID E. YOCOM (#3581) 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By. MICHAEL E. POSTMA (#6313) 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (810) 468-3421 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
CAREN BISCHEL. 
plaintiff. 
vs. 
HEATHER J. MERRITT, and SALT LAKE 
COUNTY. 
defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL, AND DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR 
SANCTIONS 
Civil No. 940900564PI 
Judae J. Dennis Frederick 
The Court having reviewed Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal, 
Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal 
and for good cause shown; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal is 
denied. Plaintiff failed to anicuiate sufficient reasons justifying relief, the trial Court's Order of 
Dismissal was not based upon a mistaken assumption of fact, strict compliance is required by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act's Notice of Claim provisions, and equitable estoppel may not 
be invoked against SaJt Lake County and the Salt Lake County Commission. It is also hereby 
ordered that Defendants' request for sanctions is denied. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this \%^y of kjff - 1994. 
BY THE COURT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I herebv certify that on this day of June, 1994,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL, AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS to the 
following: 
SAMUEL KING 
HAROLD J. DENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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